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- Hylamia, Sam, et al.
(författare)
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Security on harvested power
- 2018
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Ingår i: WiSec 2018 - Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks. - New York, NY, USA : Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. - 9781450357319 ; , s. 296-298
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Security mechanisms for battery-free devices have to operate under severe energy constraints relying on harvested energy. This is challenging, as the energy harvested from the ambient environment is usually scarce, intermittent and unpredictable. One of the challenges for developing security mechanisms for such settings is the lack of hardware platforms that recreate energy harvesting conditions experienced on a battery-free sensor node. In this demonstration, we present an energy harvesting security (EHS) platform that enables the development of security algorithms for battery-free sensors. Our results demonstrate that our platform is able to harvest sufficient energy from indoor lighting to support several widely used cryptography algorithms.
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- Hylamia, Sam, et al.
(författare)
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Tiek : Two-tier Authentication and Key Distribution for Wearable Devices
- 2019
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Ingår i: 2019 International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications (WiMob). - : IEEE. - 9781728133164 ; , s. 1-6
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Wearable devices, such as implantable medical devices and smart wearables, are becoming increasingly popular with applications that vary from casual activity monitoring to critical medical uses. Unsurprisingly, numerous security vulnerabilities have been found in this class of devices. Yet, research on physical measurement-based authentication and key distribution assumes that body-worn devices are benign and uncompromised. Tiek is a novel authentication and key distribution protocol which addresses this issue. We utilize two sources of randomness to perform device authentication and key distribution simultaneously but through separate means. This creates a two-tier authorization scheme that enables devices to join the network while protecting them from each other. We describe Tiek and analyze its security.
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| 8. |
- Yan, Wenqing, 1994-, et al.
(författare)
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PHY-IDS : A physical-layer spoofing attack detection system for wearable devices
- 2020
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Ingår i: WearSys 2020 - Proceedings of the 6th ACM Workshop on Wearable Systems and Applications, Part of MobiSys 2020. - New York, NY, USA : Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. - 9781450380133 ; , s. 1-6
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- In modern connected healthcare applications, wearable devices supporting real-time monitoring and diagnosis have become mainstream. However, wearable systems are exposed to massive cyberattacks that threaten not only data security but also human safety and life. One of the fundamental security threats is device impersonation. We therefore propose PHY-IDS; a lightweight real-time detection system that captures spoofing attacks leveraging on body motions. Our system utilizes time series of physical layer features and builds on the fact that it is non-trivial to inject malicious frames that are indistinguishable with legitimate ones. With the help of statistical learning, our system characterizes the signal behavior and flags deviations as anomalies. We experimentally evaluate PHY-IDS's performance using bodyworn devices in real attack scenarios. For four types of attackers with increasing knowledge of the deployed detection system, the results show that PHY-IDS detects naive attackers with high accuracy above 99.8\% and maintains good accuracy for stronger attackers at a range from 81.0% to 98.9%.
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